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Abstract 
This study empirically investigates if competition’s impact on firm performance depends on 
the ownership structure. Our results show that an increase in import competition has a 
positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a negative effect on firms with 
dispersed ownership, regardless of the level of domestic competition. Given that the optimal 
level of ownership concentration with respect to firm productivity is high (low) if tariffs are 
low (high) in the case when import competition is high these results are consistent with 
theoretical findings that competition has positive effects in companies that are a priori 
efficient but not in unproductive firms. If tariffs are high, however, they support inferences 
based on the x-inefficiency literature. Contrary to what has been suggested by some 
theoretical results, the riskiness of a firm’s environment does not seem to influence our 
results.  
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1. Introduction 
The creation or the development of various economic agreements between countries, and the 
assiduous activity of the WTO during the last decades have lead to a decrease in the entry 
barriers into domestic and foreign markets. Faced with a continuously changing and 
increasingly competitive environment, companies have been forced to enhance their 
productivity to insure their survival. As suggested by the theoretical literature, firm 
characteristics such as the ownership structure may play an important role in determining the 
speed and the adequacy with which firms respond to changes in competition. Two concurrent 
views have emerged in this respect. According to one stream of literature, under increased 
competition companies close to the technology frontier are incentivized to innovate and to 
increase performance; the opposite holds for laggard companies that, regardless what they do, 
expect to loose market to more efficient entrants (Boone 2000, Aghion et al 2005). The 
corporate governance literature indicates that the efficiency level of a firm, at its turn, depends 
on the ownership structure (see the survey of Lawriwsky 1984). Consequently, firms with 
good ownership structure respond better to competitive pressure, raising their productivity 
and insuring their survival. There is, however, an alternative way to link competition and 
performance via ownership structure. According to the literature that analyzes x-
inefficiencies, competition has a positive effect on managerial slack. When there are more 
competitors in the market: i. there are more opportunities for comparison, and thus better 
incentive schemes could be designed (Hart 1983);1 ii. the threat of bankruptcy is higher and 
therefore managers have to work harder to avoid it (Aghion and Howitt 1997, Schmidt 1997, 
Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey 1999). The extent to which slack is an issue in a company and 
needs to be diminished by an increased competitive pressure depends on its ownership (see 
also Lawriwsky’s 1984 survey of literature). Accordingly, when the competition intensifies, 
productivity increases more in companies with weak ownership structure. 
This paper aims to provide empirical evidences regarding the extent to which the 
effect of competition on firm performance depends on firm ownership. The empirical 
literature provides significant evidences that competition and ownership, each at its turn, have 
an effect on firm and industry productivity. However, the fact that competition’s effect on 
firm performance varies with the ownership structure is far less documented. We are aware of 
few papers that directly address this issue: Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1996), Grosfeld 
and Tressel (2002), and Konings et al. (2005). Finding out the direction in which the 
                                                 
1 See also Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983, or Hermalin (1992) for explicit schemes or Holmstrom (1982), Meyer and 
Vickers (1995), and Nickell (1994) for the implicit schemes. 
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ownership structure influences the effect an increase in competition has on firm productivity 
is important in shedding light on the conditions under which privatization or reforms that 
promote competition yield the best results. 
Our empirical analysis is done on a panel data of Czech firms for the period 1993-
2005. Czech Republic’s transition process offers an interesting case where the ownership 
structure has been quasi-exogenous during the period we study. This is due to the fact that the 
privatization of the formerly state owned enterprises has been done using different methods. 
Firm characteristics, apart from firm size, had little influence on the privatization method 
chosen by the government and on the resulting ownership structure. Once privatization has 
been completed, regulations have restricted the swapping of shares to avoid the concentration 
of financial capital. Moreover, the persistence of illiquid capital markets, underdeveloped 
entry and exit mechanisms, and soft budgets constraints during the first 7-10 years of the 
Czech transition process (Estrin 2002) have hold back further changes in ownership. Due to 
the quasi-exogenous ownership that emerged from this natural experiment, and due to the fact 
that there has been few changes in ownership following the privatization, causality between 
ownership and performance is less of an issue in our study than in related research. In 
addition, the fact that firms have been privatized using different methods has generated broad 
variations in ownership structures. 
In our study we consider one aspect of ownership structure: the level of ownership 
concentration.2 According to the theoretical literature, concentrated ownership aligns 
incentives and encourages monitoring (see Short 1994 for a survey). This is especially true 
when takeovers are not a threat (John and Kedia 2000) and the secondary markets do not 
perform their monitoring role (see the literature survey of Becht, Bolton and Röell 2003), as is 
the case in transition countries where market monitoring has been weak and the takeover 
market has been underdeveloped (Estrin 2002). Yet, dispersed ownership increases managers’ 
incentives to acquire information (Aghion and Tirole 1997) and could serve as a commitment 
device that promotes managerial activism (Burkart et all 1997). Therefore when firms face 
high uncertainty managers’ ability to react fast to changes might be crucial in ensuring good 
performance and concentrated ownership might not be the optimal structure with respect to 
firm performance. Conversely, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that in uncertain 
                                                 
2 Foreign versus domestic ownership or private versus state ownership are issues that are often raised in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. In our dataset in many instances we did not have information on the country 
of origin for the owners. However, for those we had the fact that the foreign ownership prevails or not did not 
play a role for firm performance. Also, since in the Czech Republic almost all the companies have been 
privatized at the outset of the transition process, state owned enterprises are too weak represented in our sample 
to make any valuable inferences. 
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environments it is harder to distinguish managerial effort or ability from randomness and thus 
concentration should increase. These considerations suggest that good ownership is 
concentrated ownership unless a firm faces a highly risky environment. In the latter case it is 
less clear if ownership concentration is desirable. 
Our results confirm that ownership characteristics and competition influence firm 
performance. Surprisingly, they show that the optimal level of ownership structure is 
dispersed ownership when import competition in weak and concentrated ownership when 
import competition is tough. Also, as conjectured, they show that the impact of an increase in 
competition on firm performance depends on the ownership structure. Thus, regardless of the 
level of domestic competition, if ownership is concentrated a decrease in tariff protection has 
a positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a negative effect on firms with 
dispersed ownership. These results are consistent with our conjectures base on the theoretical 
results of Boone (2000) and Aghion et al (2005) in the case when import competition is 
tough. On the contrary they support inferences based on the x-inefficiency literature when 
tariffs are high.  
In our data risk does not influence ownership concentration which supports our initial 
assumption that the ownership structures in the Czech Republic have been rather exogenous. 
In addition the riskiness of a firm’s environment does not seem to influence the impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance. 
Overall our results suggest that in an increasingly globalized world where the costs of 
trade decrease or when trade liberalization is envisaged, the companies with concentrated 
ownership structure will adapt better to increased competitive pressure from abroad. Yet, 
given that this recommendation is based on results obtained on the Czech data, it might only 
hold for economic environments similar to the one extant in the Czech Republic during the 
transition period, thus for economies in which market monitoring is weak and the takeover 
market is underdeveloped. 
The remaining paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 briefly presents the 
economic reforms and the privatization process done by the Czech Republic. Section 3 
discusses the main empirical evidences. Section 4 presents our data and methodology. The 
results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Short overview of economic reforms in the Czech Republic 
The economic transformation in the CEE has begun in the pre-transition period, while Michail 
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Gorbachov launched his program of economic reforms known as perestroika. In December 
1988 the former Czechoslovakia3 has launched a first generation of trade agreements with the 
Western Europe to lift restrictive quotas against their exports. The fall of the communist 
regimes of the CEE countries in the following year and the subsequent end of the CMEA, 
their economic agreement among them and Russia, had allowed Czechoslovakia to formally 
start its gradual process of EU integration. Thus, in December 1991 Czechoslovakia has 
signed a trade agreement with the European Community that set a gradual schedule of trade 
liberalization in industrial products between the EU and the Czech Republic over a 10 year 
period.4 According to it, the EU had to abolish quotas on all industrial products (except 
textiles and coal) and custom duties on a substantial number of industrial products upon the 
entry into force of the agreement. The Czech Republic had to follow suit and by 2001 all the 
tariffs on manufacturing between the two trading partners had to be lifted. 
In parallel, at the beginning of the 90s some of the former planned economies have 
decided to revive the trade among them. On December 21, 1992, the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) was created by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Later 
Slovenia (1996), Romania (1997), and Bulgaria (1999) have joined the agreement. However, 
the creation of CEFTA did not manage to bust the trade in the region to the same extent as the 
Europe Agreements did (Appendix, Table 1). 
Trade reforms were also accompanied by other reforms that touched all the sectors of 
the economy. In January 1991, a far-reaching shock therapy has been started that apart from 
trade liberalization included privatization, price decontrol, drastic cuts in public subsidies to 
enterprises, a reform of the financial sector, and internal convertibility of the country’s 
currency, the Koruna (Table 1).  
Privatization has been completed by mid ‘90s. Among the firms that have not been 
restituted to former owners, most small firms were auctioned or sold in tenders, most medium 
firms were sold in tenders or to direct buyers, while large firms have participated in voucher 
privatization programs, have been sold in auctions or to strategic investors, or transferred to 
municipalities. The first two years after the voucher privatization has been completed (1995-
1996) were characterized by extensive swapping of shares. The swaps were, however, 
restricted by legal requirements that aimed to prevent the excessive concentration of the 
financial capital. For example, the share of ownership held by privatization funds (IPFs) in a 
                                                 
3 The former Czechoslovakia existed until January 1, 1993 when it broke-up to form two different countries: the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. 
4 The Czech Republic is a member of the EU since May 1, 2004. 
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given company has been restricted to 20 percent or less and privatization funds where not 
allowed to purchase shares of other financial institutions.  
The Czech legislation confers different rights to owners according to their ownership 
share. Large owners with stakes above 50% have the most rights, being allowed to change the 
board or the management, or alter firm’s assets. Yet, their decisions could be blocked by 
blocking minority owners with shares between 33% and 50%. Further, legal minority owners 
that hold a 10% to 33% stake in the company may impede the implementation of unwanted 
decisions through lengthy court proceedings. In addition, the government may keep a golden 
share in a company that allows it to veto certain managerial decisions. The Czech government 
has retained golden shares in about 100 companies in food, telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, cinema, publishing, electricity and gas distribution 
and water and sewage sectors.  
 
3. Relation to previous empirical research 
Empirical evidences on the relation between ownership concentration and firm performance 
are abundant (see for example the literature review of Denis and McConnell 2003). However, 
there is no consensus regarding the direction of this relationship. Among others, Mitton 
(2002) and Claessens and Djankov (1999) find a positive relationship while Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), Kocenda (2003) and Lskavyan and Spatareanu (2006) do not find any 
significant relationship between concentration and performance. 
The empirical evidence on the degree to which ownership concentration influences the 
relation between market competition and firm performance is scarce. We are only aware of 
the work by Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1996) on UK, and Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) 
on Poland. Using a panel data of 125 UK manufacturing companies over the period 1982-
1994 Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1996) investigate if competitive pressure may serve as a 
substituting device to ownership structure in inducing good firm performance. They find that 
the impact of competition on firm productivity is lower when firms have a dominant external 
shareholder. The ownership data was available for only one of the years between 1983 and 
1985. The very small sample used in the empirical analysis raises questions regarding sample 
representativeness and therefore the generality of these results. Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) 
have conducted a similar analysis on all non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE) over the period 1991-1998. 153 companies were included in the analysis. 
Their results show that, unlike in Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1996), competition and 
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good corporate governance reinforce each other. In this study good corporate governance is 
defined based on their own empirical results to be either dispersed ownership or the existence 
of a controlling shareholder. This study includes only companies quoted in WSE, which 
constitutes a negligible share of all Polish companies. Given the small sample used in the 
analysis, the generality of these results may be questioned. Moreover, for firms that are 
quoted in stock exchanges the stock market monitoring is an alternative mechanism to 
ownership structure or to competition that plays a role in firm performance. In our case, most 
of the companies are not quoted in stock exchanges. 
Also related to our research is the work of Konings et al. (2005) who study the impact 
of the privatization of manufacturing firms in Bulgaria and Romania on price markups. They 
find out that the higher the competitive pressure is the more positive is the impact of 
privatization on price-cost margins. Konings et al. (2005) interpret this result as being 
evidence that in highly competitive environments, privatized firms reduce costs rather than 
increase prices. Thus, much like in the case of Grosfeld and Tressel (2002), competition and 
better ownership structure resulted from privatization reinforce each other with respect to firm 
performance. In their study Konings et al (2005) only distinguish between domestic and 
private ownership, while we would like to emphasize another aspect of ownership structure: 
the ownership dispersion. 
 
4. Methodology and data description 
Our empirical goal is to estimate changes in firm productivity that has accompanied increased 
competition and to relate these changes with ownership concentration. We assume that the 
amount of output produced by a firm depends on the level of capital, labor and on the effort 
employed by its manager. The managerial effort, at its turn, is affected by a firm’s ownership 
structure, by the degree of competition it faces, as well as by the combined effect of 
ownership and competition. We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function. We estimate a 
dynamic model that uses a lagged dependent variable in order to take into account that it takes 
time until the output reaches its new long-run level when a factor of production changes. 
Therefore our empirical model is 
 
1 (1 ) (1 )it i t it k it l ity y k lβ β λ λ β λ β−= + + + − + − +  
     2 2, 2 , , 2 ,o it c ind t c ind t oc it ind t oc it ind t itOw c c Ow c Ow cβ β β β β ε+ + + + + +  (1) 
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where i is the firm subscript, t is the time subscript, y is log of real output (value added)5, k is 
log of capital stock, l is log of employment, Ow stands for ownership concentration, c for the 
degree of competition. βi and βt are unobserved firm and time effects. The lagged dependent 
variable takes into account persistent productivity shocks. ε are all other productivity shocks 
that are assumed to be serially uncorrelated. Our model bares similarities with Nickell (1996, 
1997) and Grosfeld and Tressel (2002). We estimate it in first differences, using the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) for dynamic panels with lagged dependent variable 
developed by Arellano and Bond’s (1991, 1998). We treat labor as endogenous while capital, 
which adjusts slower to changes in production, we treated as predetermined (e.g. state 
variable). To avoid possible endogeneity problems and to account for the fact that firms’ 
adjustments to changes in competition may take time to materialize, we use lagged values of 
competition. For the former reason we also use lagged values of ownership concentration. 
Since prior theoretical and empirical results indicate that the impact of competition on firm 
productivity might be of an inverted U-shape we also use a square term for competition.  
The empirical analysis is done on a panel dataset of Czech firms for the period 1993-
2005 provided by Amadeus. We had access to the medium version of Amadeus database that 
contains information on medium and large firms (around 14000 firms), including sector 
classification, balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, number of employees, and detailed 
ownership information. To this data we further added industry level data, such as producer 
price indexes (PPI), tariffs, imports, and industrial output. Industry comes from the Czech 
Statistical Office, Eurostat, and UNIDO. These sources provide very detailed information and 
therefore most of the variables we used are at 4 or 3-digit level.  
The competitive pressure faced by a firm in its market is captured by two measures. 
The first one, Comp, aims at proxying the competitive pressure arising from firms active in 
the domestic market. It is measured at 4-digit ISIC level using a Herfindal index where the 
sum of the squares of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry was 
normalized by the industrial output, squared. We use our own dataset to identify these 
companies. The second one, Tariff, seeks to capture the effect of foreign competition and is 
the weighted average, by trade value, of effectively applied rates at 4-digit ISIC level. The 
ownership concentration variable, Ow, is also a Herfindal index and is defined as the sum of 
squared shares detained by the four owners with the highest shares in the company (see 
                                                 
5 To obtain firm level real output we deflate value added with industry price index. Therefore changes in our 
measure of real output could be driven by changes in productivity as well as by relative changes between a 
firm’s prices and the price index.  
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Appendix 1). 
Because, as we discussed before, it has been argued that the optimal level of 
ownership concentration for firm performance might be different for companies that act in 
highly risky environments than in stable conditions, we add to our Model (1) a variable Risk 
that aims to capture this aspect. It is computed at 4 digit NACE level as the standard deviation 
of return on assets of all the companies in an industry in a given year6 (see Appendix 1). The 
natural way to introduce Risk in our estimation is as an instrumental variable. As we 
discussed, the riskiness of a firm’s environment may determine the optimal level of ownership 
concentration. Given that firm performance may have at its turn an impact on ownership 
concentration, to deal with this endogeneity we could use Risk as an instrument when 
estimating (1). Yet, if the ownership structure in the Czech Republic has been fairly 
exogenous, as we argue in the introduction, Risk is not a valid instrument. In this case, since 
Risk should have an impact on the optimality of ownership concentration and therefore of the 
impact ownership has on firm productivity (directly or through its combined effect with 
competition) we add Risk as a regressor. We construct two additional models. First we add it 
as a simple regressor, and then we add its interaction term with ownership concentration. 
 
tindRit Riskregressorsinitialy ,γ+=  (2) 
ittindRotindRit OwRiskRiskregressorsinitialy ,, γγ ++=  (3) 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main variables we use in our regressions. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of main variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
y 2551 6.580 1.213 0.900 11.058 
l 2551 5.564 1.021 1.609 9.616 
k 2551 6.653 1.566 0.118 12.192 
Ow (lag) 2551 0.525 0.319 0.000 1 
Risk 2551 13.787 8.006 0.163 86.76 
Tarif 2551 6.427 4.422 0.060 27.53 
Comp 2551 0.034 0.072 0.000 0.752 
 
 
5. Results 
We start by estimating Model (1) using Arellano and Bond’s GMM method for dynamic 
                                                 
6 We have also used two other alternative measures of Risk at the industry level (the standard deviation of return 
on assets of all the companies in an industry for all the period) and at firm level (the standard deviation of return 
on assets for all the period in a given firm). The results did not change. 
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panels. The results are given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Regression results 
 Main models (Nickell) Robustness checks 
 M1 M2 M3 Nickell CRS OP Prod 
OP Prod 
& CRS 
lag y 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.194***   
 (3.23) (3.23) (3.24) (3.78)   
l 0.300***7 0.305*** 0.307*** 0.455***   
 (3.66) (3.71) (3.72) (6.36)   
k 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.235*** 1.670***   
 (2.76) (2.74) (2.77) (3.41)   
lag productivity     0.178*** 0.192*** 
     (2.67) (3.08) 
Ow 1.940*** 1.942*** 1.987*** 0.194*** 1.481** 1.275** 
 (3.89) (3.88) (3.87) (3.78) (2.33) (2.08) 
Comp 2.254*** 2.257*** 2.276*** 1.980** 2.384*** 2.121** 
 (2.93) (2.93) (2.92) (2.57) (2.70) (2.43) 
   * Ow -3.104*** -3.126*** -3.181*** -2.625** -3.514*** -2.993** 
 (2.63) (2.64) (2.61) (-2.23) (2.61) (2.25) 
Comp 2 -4.825*** -4.840*** -4.878*** -4.513*** -5.043** -4.657** 
 (3.19) (3.19) (3.19) (-2.97) (2.48) (2.32) 
    * Ow 6.080*** 6.140*** 6.258*** 5.489*** 6.681*** 5.938** 
 (3.15) (3.16) (3.12) (2.89) (2.68) (2.42) 
Tariff 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.185*** 0.144** 0.143** 
 (3.50) (3.51) (3.53) (3.11) (2.03) (2.10) 
   * Ow -0.413*** -0.413*** -0.418*** -0.352*** -0.311** -0.266** 
 (3.90) (3.89) (3.91) (-3.41) (2.35) (2.10) 
Tariff 2 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.005** 
 (3.56) (3.55) (3.57) (-3.22) (2.28) (2.30) 
   * Ow 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.010** 
 (3.91) (3.89) (3.90) (3.43) (2.42) (2.18) 
Risk  -0.000 0.001    
  (0.40) (0.36)    
   * Ow    -0.002    
   (0.58)    
Serial correlation -5.20 -5.20 -5.21 -5.49 -5.18 -5.11 
Sargan test χ2 (213) = 
229.80 
χ2 (213) = 
203.26 
χ2 (213) = 
229.92 
χ2 (213) = 
226.25 
χ2 (101) = 
98.29 
χ2 (100) = 
102.23 
 0.204 0.199 0.203 0.254 0.558 0.419 
N firms 873 873 873 873 676 676 
N observations 2551 2551 2551 2551 1857 1857 
Note: We used one step GMM (xtabond2, Stata). Added value, capital and employment are expressed in logs. 
Ow stands for ownership concentration and is lagged once. Similarly, Comp and Tariff which respectively 
measure the intensity of domestic and foreign competition are lagged once. Control variables included in 
regressions but not reported: year dummies and industry dummies at 2 digit level. 
 
                                                 
7 This is the coefficient of employment we get when estimating our model. Given the way we specified it, in fact 
βl is equal with 0.3/(1-0.17) = 0.361. Similar calculations should be done to compute the elasticities of capital 
and labor in all the regressions. 
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They confirm that ownership characteristics and competition influence firm performance. 
Also, as we conjectured, they show that the impact of an increase in competition on firm 
performance depends on the level of ownership concentration. Thus, the direct effect of an 
increase in ownership on firm performance is significant and positive. Also if the level of 
domestic or foreign competition is not too high, the direct effect of a further increase is to 
induce higher productivity. If, however, competition is harsh, a further increase in it has a 
negative direct impact on firm performance. These findings are valid for both domestic and 
foreign competition.  
The presence of many interaction terms between ownership concentration and 
competition renders difficult the inference of the total effect that changes in them, each at its 
turn, have on firm performance. To ease this interpretation Figures 1 draw the iso-productivity 
curves for ownership concentration and domestic competition keeping once tariff fixed at its 
mean value minus one standard deviation (fig T1), at the mean value (fig T2), and at one 
standard deviation above the mean value (fig T3). Similarly, fig C1, C2 and C3 draw the iso-
productivity curves for Ow and Tariff fixing Comp respectively at 0, the mean value, the 
mean value plus one standard deviation. We allowed Tariff and Comp to vary only between 
their mean values minus/plus one standard deviation.  
According to the iso-productivity curves shown in T1, when tariff is low, thus the 
competition from imports is high, concentrated ownership is optimal. If ownership is 
concentrated, an increase in competition (thus a decrease in Comp) moves the company on a 
higher iso-productivity curve; if ownership is dispersed, an increase in competition has an 
adverse effect on firm productivity. When tariff is average or high (fig T2 and T3), so import 
competition is weak, “good” ownership becomes dispersed ownership. Much like before an 
increase in competition has a positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a 
negative effect on firms with dispersed ownership. The results we get keeping tariff fixed are 
also confirmed looking the iso-productivity curves when the level of domestic competition is 
fixed (figures C). Regardless of the domestic competition level, if ownership is concentrated a 
decrease in tariff protection has a positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a 
negative effect on firms with dispersed ownership. However, when tariff is low, good 
ownership is concentrated ownership while when tariff is high dispersed ownership is 
optimal. The above results are consistent with our conjectures base on the theoretical results 
of Boone (2000) and Aghion et al (2005) in the case when import competition is high and 
thus concentrated ownership is optimal.  
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Figures 1. Iso-productivity curves 
     T1. tariff = avg – std dev (= 2.005)    C1. comp = 0  
           
           
  T2. tariff = avg (= 6.427)             C2. comp = avg (= 0.034) 
   
           
        T3. tariff = avg + std dev (=10.849)      C3. comp = avg + std dev (=0.106) 
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On the contrary they support inferences based on the x-inefficiency literature when tariffs are 
high and dispersed ownership is the best ownership structure. 
Further on, we check if the stability of a firm’s environment plays a role on the 
optimality of ownership concentration with respect to firm performance and thus should be 
used as an instrument for ownership concentration. Table 3 shows there is almost no 
relationship between Risk and Ow as their correlation is practically 0. As suggested in 
Wooldrige (2002) to further check if Risk is a valid instrument, we have also regressed 
ownership concentration on Risk and all the exogenous variables, including the instruments 
used by Arellano and Bond’s GMM. Again, the fact that the coefficient of Risk is equal to 
zero cannot be rejected. These results indicate that Risk is not a valid instrument. In the case 
of the Czech Republic this could be due to the fact that the ownership structures resulted from 
privatisation have been exogenous and remained exogenous over most of the transition period 
due to rigidities in related markets and policy regulations. 
 
Table 3. Correlation between Risk and Ow 
   Correlation with 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Added value Ow 
Risk 13.787 8.01 0.079 0 
   * Ow  7.244 6.59 0.149 0.675 
   * Comp * Ow 0.281 1.03 0.083 0.200 
   * Comp 2 * Ow 0.057 0.62 0.014 0.079 
   * Tariff * Ow 44.950 56.62 0.066 0.426 
   * Tariff 2 * Ow 404.525 1035.90 0.015 0.159 
 
Given that Risk is not a valid instrument, to further investigate if the optimality of 
ownership concentration varies with the level of stability of a firm’s environment we estimate 
Models (2) and (3) where Risk is first introduced independently and then together with its 
interaction term with ownership concentration. The results are given in Table 2. Models (2) 
and (3) show that there is neither a direct effect of Risk on firm performance nor a combined 
effect of Risk and ownership concentration, further supporting our conjecture that ownership 
structure has been rather exogenous in the Czech Republic. The remaining effects, included in 
Model (1) are robust to the introduction of Risk remaining practically unchanged.  
 
 
Robustness checks 
Given that the effect that Risk does not seem to play a crucial role in this context, we favor 
Model (1) and do the robustness checks with respect to it. 
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It has been shown that measurement errors bias coefficients toward zero. Out of all the 
variables used in our estimation, we believe that the coefficient of capital is mostly affected 
by measurement errors. One way to deal with this bias is to introduce a constant return to 
scale (CRS) restriction in the estimates. To impose CRS in Model (1) we rewrite (1) as 
 
  ittinditoctindcitoititlitittiitit cOwcOwklkyky εββββλλββ ++++−−+−++=− − ,,1 )()1()(  (5) 
 
When we estimated (5) we get the results in Table 2. They closely match the results we got 
before. 
Given its attractive properties, one of the most popular methods in the empirical 
literature to estimate firm productivity is the Olley and Pakes (1996) semi-parametric method 
(from here on OP). In a first stage we estimate this productivity by industry at 2 digit level.8 
Herein lies the advantage of this method with the one used in our main model that impose the 
same production function to all firms in all industries. In the second stage we regress the 
predicted productivity on our repressors according to the following model 
 
ittinditoctindcitoittiit cOwcOwprpr εβββλββ ++++++= − ,,1 . (6) 
 
As before we estimate the equation (6) using Arellano-Bond’s GMM method for dynamic 
panels. Further, we also estimate (6) imposing CRS in the productivity, assuming that OP 
provides an unbiased estimate of the labour coefficient and thus calculating the capital 
coefficient by subtracting from 1 the labour coefficient. In both cases, using the OP 
productivity without and with CRS, the estimated coefficients are highly significant and are 
similar in signs and magnitude with the coefficients we got for Model (1) (see results in Table 
2). Using OP without CRS we get higher capital coefficients (even though they are not shown 
in the table) which is another reason to use (6) as an alternative to the main model. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this empirical study that uses financial and industrial level data for a panel of Czech 
                                                 
8 As the Olley and Pakes method is widely used in the literature we will not spend time here to present it. In the 
end, to estimate productivity with this method taking into account the selectivity bias, we first estimated 
( )0 ( , )it l it k it it it ity l k h i kβ β β υ= + + + + , where h(,) is a function approximated in our case by a 3rd degree 
polynomial function, and υ is a white noise. To further determine βk, in a second stage we estimate 
itititkititkitlit kkly υξβφθββ ++−+=− −− )( 11 . 1itϕ − equals 11 ˆˆ −− − itlit ly β  and ξ stands for unexpected productivity 
shocks We used non-linear estimations where we used a 5th degree polynomial expansion to approximate the 
function θ(). Firm productivity is then itkitlitit klypr ββ ˆˆ −−= .  
 15
companies we have in fact investigated two issues: i. which is the optimal level of ownership 
concentration, and ii. if the impact of an increase in competition (both foreign and domestic) 
on firm performance depends on the ownership structure. We have found out that the optimal 
level of ownership concentration varies with the level of import competition being highly 
concentrated ownership if tariffs are low and dispersed ownership when tariffs are high. 
Contrary to what has been suggested by some theoretical results, the riskiness of a firm’s 
environment does not seem to influence this result. With respect to the impact of competition 
on firm productivity, our results show that for any level of domestic competition an increase 
import competition has a positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a negative 
effect on firms with dispersed ownership. The above results are consistent with our 
conjectures base on the theoretical results of Boone (2000) and Aghion et al (2005) in the case 
when import competition is high. If tariffs are high, however, they support inferences based 
on the x-inefficiency literature.  
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Table 1. Main economic reforms 
Timing Reforms 
July 1990 Cancellation of the negative turnover tax in Czechoslovakia 
October 1990 –  
January 1991 
Cumulative devaluation of the koruna by around 75% against 
convertible currencies 
January 1991 A package of macroeconomic measures was launched. It included: 
? price liberalization (except for some sensitive prices such as 
electricity, gas, heating, rents, postage, public transport, etc.) 
? trade liberalization 
? wage regulation 
? drastic cuts in subsidies to enterprises 
? restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
? sharp devaluation and the introduction of partial convertibility of 
the currency, koruna  
December 16, 1991 The Association Agreement with the EU was signed 
January 1, 1993 Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
January 1993 Introduction of VAT. 
February 8, 1993 Separate Czech and Slovak currencies were introduced 
May 1993 The first wave of voucher privatisation 
May and July 1994 Liberalization of coal and gasoline prices 
March 1995 The second wave of voucher privatisation 
July 1995 Abolition of general wage regulation 
October 1995 Full current account convertibility of the Czech koruna 
January 1996 Official application for EU membership 
May 1, 2004 The country becomes a member of the EU 
January 2002 – 
December 2005 
Gradual liberalization of electricity prices 
March 2003 – … Liberalization of rents 
January 2005 – 
December 2006 
Gradual liberalization of gas prices 
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Appendix 1 – Data description 
Firm level data are from Amadeus. Amadeus is a pan-European commercial database, 
provided by Bureau van Dijk, which contains financial information on public and private 
companies. We used data from all versions of the Amadeus database since 1996 with 
information on medium and large firms. Most of the Czech firms included in the database 
produce goods in several industries at 4 digit NACE level. We have classified firms according 
to their main activity.  
 
We did the following modifications to the data:  
i. we excluded all companies that had less than 10 employees: 
ii. we excluded firms with non-positive investment levels when estimating firm productivity 
iii. since we did not have enough observations in three industries at 2-digit NACE level (16 – 
manufacture of tobacco, 23 – manufacture of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, 30 – 
manufacture of office machinery and computers) to estimate the production function we 
dropped companies from this sector. 
iv. we dropped 2 observations to exclude firms with market shares higher than 100. 
v. we dropped 6 observations to exclude firms with a productivity index less than -5 as they 
looked to be outliers (see Figure A1.4). 
 
Table A1.1. Variables 
Variable Definition 
y (log of output) Added value deflated by the producer price index (PPI). For most of the 
industries, we have the PPI at 3-digit NACE; for the remaining we have 
used PPI at 2-digit NACE.9 
Sources: Added value is from Amadeus and Aspekt; PPI from the Czech Statistical 
Office. 
Coverage: 1993-2005 
k (capital) Tangible fixed assets deflated by the price index for gross fixed capital 
formation, at a slightly more aggregated level than 2-digit NACE. 
Sources: Tangible fixed assets are from Amadeus and Aspekt; price index for gross 
fixed capital formation from AMECO. 
Coverage: 1993-2005 
l (log of labour) Number of employees. 
Sources: Amadeus and Aspekt 
Coverage: 1994-2005 
i (investment) Computed as ititit kki )1(1 δ−−= + , where δ = 15%. 
Coverage: 1993-2004 
Tariff Weighted average (by trade value) of effectively applied rates, taking 
into consideration applicable (and available) preferential duties. 
Source: WTO 
Coverage: 1994-2004 
Comp The ratio of the sum of the squares of the sales the 4 companies with the 
biggest sales of the four largest firms in an industry (according to our 
data) and the square of the industrial output, at 4-digit ISIC level. 
Sources: Firm sales are from Amadeus and Aspekt; industrial output is from UNIDO 
                                                 
9Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) show that deflating value added with PPI rather than a firm specific price 
index leads to very similar estimates of the coefficients in the production function. 
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via Campus Solutions. 
Coverage: 1995-2003 
Ow The sum of squared shares detained by the 4 owners with the highest 
shares in the company. 
Sources: Ownership information from Amadeus and Aspekt. 
Coverage: 1997-2003 
Risk The standard deviation of return on assets of all the companies in an 
industry in a given year, at 4 digit NACE level 
Sources: Amadeus and Aspekt 
Coverage: 1994-2005 
  
